In recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been proposed, many of them fundamentally flawed by a lack of robustness and security. This paper describes the security weaknesses of a recently proposed cryptographic algorithm with chaos at the physical level. We show that the security is trivially compromised for practical implementations of the cryptosystem with finite computing precision and for the use of the iteration number n as the secret key. We also give some suggestions to improve its security.
Introduction
In a world where digital communications are becoming ever more prevalent, there are still services working in analog form. Some examples of analog communications systems widely used today include voice communications over telephone lines, TV and radio broadcasting and radio communications (see Table 1 ). Although most of these services are also being gradually replaced by their digital counterparts, they will remain with us for a long time. Usually the need to protect the confidentiality of the information transmitted by these means might arise. Thus, there is a growing demand for technologies and methods to encrypt the information so that it is only available in inteligible form to the authorized users.
In [1] , a secure communication system based on chaos at the physical level is presented, i.e., a scheme that encrypts the wave signal itself. First, the band-limited analog signal with bandwidth W is sampled at a frequency f ≥ 2W to avoid aliasing. At the end of the sampling process, the signal is converted to a sequence s 0 = {s 0 1 , s 0 2 , . . . , s 0 l } of real values. Next, the signal is quantized: the amplitude of the signal is divided into N subintervals and every interval is assigned a real amplitude value q k , k = 1, . . . , N, its middle point for example. Thus, a new sequence is generated by replacing each s Once the original wave signal is sampled and quantized, and restricted to the unit interval, a chaotic encryption signal {x
, is used to generate the ciphertext. This signal is obtained by either sampling a chaotic one or by a chaotic mapping. For the purposes of our analysis, the process to generate the chaotic signal is irrelevant. . The encrypted signal is given by y n i , where n is considered as the secret key of the cryptosystem. As a result, a plaintext signal with values y 0 i ∈ {q 1 , . . . , q N }, is encrypted into a signal which can take 2 n N different values. For a more complete explanation of this cryptosystem, it is highly recommended the thorough reading of [1] .
Convergence to zero of the digital baker map
The cryptosystem proposed in [1] uses the baker map as a mixing function. When the baker map is implemented with finite computing precision, this map has a stable attractor at (0, 0). This is easy to see when the value of x is represented in binary form with L significant bits. Assuming
, the baker map runs as follows:
where ≪ denotes the left bit-shifting operation. Apparently, the most significant bit b 1 is eaten in the above iterating procedure of the baker map. As a result, after m ≥ L iterations, x m ≡ 0. In IEEE double-precision floating-point arithmetic, L = 52. This means that the value of the secret key n must be smaller than 52. Also, it is expected that each plaintext sample y n when a 100-sample ciphertext is decrypted. It can be appreciated how the plaintext is correctly recovered only when n ≤ 45. For n ≥ 52, the system does not work at all.
As a consequence, breaking a ciphertext encrypted with this cryptosystem is trivial. Only n = 45 secret keys have to be tried. This takes a modern desktop computer less than a second for moderated lengths of the plaintext. This attack is called a brute force attack, which breaks a cipher by trying every possible key. The quicker the brute force attack, the weaker the cipher. The feasibility of a brute force attack depends on the size of the cipher's key space and on the amount of computational power available to the attacker. With today's computer technology, it is generally agreed in the cryptography community that a size of the key space K < 2 100 ≈ 10 30 is insecure [2] . Compare this figure with the key space K = 45 of the cipher under study.
If the value of n could be arbitrarily enlarged, then the encryption process would slow down until it would be unusable in practice. Thus, from any point of view, this is an impractical encryption method because it is either totally insecure or infinitely slow, without any reasonable tradeoff possible. In Table 1 a review of some still widely used analog communications systems with their bandwidth and sampling frequencies is given. Consider for example TV broadcasting, which transmits 12,000,000 samples per second. It is impossible to iterate the baker map billions of times for 12,000,000 samples in one second with average computing power.
Finally, another physical limitation of the cryptosystem is that when n is very large, each encrypted sample y n i would require a vast amount of bits to be transmitted. This would require in turn a transmission channel with infinite capacity if digital transmission is used. However, if analog transmission is used, then it would be impossible to transmit the samples with the precision required.
Determinism of the ciphertext
In this section it is shown that even assuming that the messages are encrypted with an imaginary computer with infinite precision and infinite speed, using an infinite-bandwidth channel, the cryptosystem would be trivially broken as well. To begin with, let us assume that two quantization levels are used, that is, N = 2. During the encryption process a binary tree is generated in the following way: , (2) where the subscript b denotes the binary format of the involved real decimal.
The fact that the ciphertext uses 2 n N discrete amplitudes constitutes its weakest point. It is possible to directly get the value of n with only one known amplitude. In Eq. (2), it is obvious that y n i must be one value in the set 2j + 1 2 n+2
Following the IEEE-standard floating-point format [3] , any amplitude value y n i will be represented in the following form:
where1 denotes the implicit 1-bit occurring before all other mantissa bits 1 and b l = 1. From Eq. (3), one can see that l +m = n+2. Therefore, we can directly derive n = (l + m) − 2, by checking which bit is the least significant bit (i.e., the least significant 1-bit) in all bits of y n i . A more intuitive way to compute n from a single amplitude value, y n i , consists of two steps: i) representing this amplitude value in fixed-point binary form; ii) counting the bits in the fixed-point format of y n i to determine the value of an integer B, which is the number of bits after the radix dot and before the least significant bit, i.e., y v , the value of n can still be derived easily, but the calculation algorithm depends on how the binary tree shown in Eq. (2) is re-designed.
In [1] it is hinted that the value of n could be changed dynamically based on some information of the encrypted trajectory. Unfortunately, this idea would not further increase the security of the cryptosystem as long as 2 n N different amplitudes are still possible for each different n value. This means that the ciphertext value y n i i , whatever n i , can only take values from the finite set defined in Eq. (3) for the given n i . Hence, for each y n i i the value of n i can be computed as described above and the security is again trivially compromised.
Improving the cryptosystem
There are many ways to improve the security of the attacked cryptosystem. This section introduces three possible ones: changing the key, changing the 2-D chaotic map, and masking the ciphertext with a secret signal. Note that only some basic ideas are given, and the concrete designs and detailed security analysis are omitted.
Changing the key
As mentioned above, in addition to the above-discussed security defects of the secret key n, using n as the secret key has another obvious paradox: from the point of view of the security, n should be as large as possible; while from the point of view of the encryption speed, n should be as small as possible. Apparently, n is not a good option as the secret key.
Instead of using n, better candidates for the secret key must be chosen, such as the control parameter of the 2-D chaotic map and the generation parameter of the encryption signal x. If the former is chosen, the baker map has to be modified to introduce some secret control parameters, as described in the following section.
Changing the 2-D chaotic map
As is well known, the multiplication factor 2 in the original baker map is the essential reason of its convergence to (0, 0) (i.e., the small key space), so the baker map has to be modified to cancel this problem, or another 2-D chaotic map without this problem has to be used.
A possible way is to generalize the original baker map to a discretized version over a M × N lattice of the unit plane. For example, when M = N = 2, the lattice is composed of the following four points: (0.125, 0.125), (0.125, 0.725), (0.725, 0.125) and (0.725, 0.725). A typical example of baker map discretized in this way can be found in [4] . With such a discretization, the negative convergence to zero can be removed. However, another negative digital effect, the recurrence of the orbit, arises in this case, since any orbit will eventually become periodic within MN iterations. This means that the security defect caused by the small key space is not essentially improved. Thus, the discretized baker map must be used when the key is changed to be its discretization parameters.
Another way is to use entirely different 2-D chaotic maps with one or more adjustable parameters, which can be used as the secret key instead of n.
Masking the ciphertext with a secret pseudo-random signal
An easy way to enhance the security of the cryptosystem is to mask the ciphertext with a secret pseudo-random signal, which can efficiently eliminate the possibility to derive the estimated value of n from one amplitude of the ciphertext. The secret masking sequence can be the encryption signal x, and the generation parameters of x should be added as part of the secret key. Note that the masking can be considered as an added stream cipher to the original system. This is a common technique to achieve stronger ciphers [5] .
Conclusions
We have shown that the new cryptosystem proposed in [1] can be trivially broken due to the limitation of computers to represent real numbers. Even if an ideal computer with infinite precision were used to encrypt the messages, the cipher can still be trivially broken due to the fact that the number and value of possible amplitude values in the ciphertext depend directly on the secret key n. Furthermore, for the cryptosystem to work with large values of n, an ideal computer with infinite computing speed, infinite storage capacity, and infinite transmission speed would be required. We have also discussed some methods to improve its security, although it should be completely redesigned to achieve a higher degree of security. As a consequence, we consider that this cryptosystem should not be used in secure applications. Tables   Table 1  Analog communication 
